Organizational Change and Skill Accumulation by Caroli, Eve et al.
HAL Id: hal-02104951
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02104951
Submitted on 29 Apr 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Organizational Change and Skill Accumulation
Eve Caroli, Nathalie Greenan, Dominique Guellec
To cite this version:
Eve Caroli, Nathalie Greenan, Dominique Guellec. Organizational Change and Skill Accumula-
tion. Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press (OUP), 2001, 10 (2), pp.481-506.
￿10.1093/icc/10.2.481￿. ￿hal-02104951￿
Organizational Change and Skill
Accumulation
EV E CA R O L I a , NA T H A L I E GR E E N A N b and
DO M I N I Q U E GU E L L E C c
(aINRA-LEA and CEPREMAP, bCentre d’Etude de l’Emploi and cOECD/STI)
We model the links between skills and changes in work organization. As the proportion
of skilled workers increases, the economy travels through a sequence of organizational
equilibria. We show that as the relative supply of skills increases the organization of
work becomes more decentralized. Both skilled and unskilled workers become more
autonomous and perform a wider range of tasks: decentralization spreads across firms
at the expense of the old centralized organization based on a strict division of labor.
Moreover, as firms switch to decentralization, their employment structure becomes more
homogeneous and wage inequality stops decreasing. These predictions are compared with
empirical evidence based on French establishment-level data and we find support for
both of them. This suggests that the long-term increase in the skill level of the workforce
may have been one important factor driving the recent introduction of new work practices
by a large number of firms.
1. Introduction
For several years now the organization of work inside firms has been under-
going tremendous changes. The labels given to innovative organizational
practices are quite diverse: re-engineering, just in time, delayering, lean
production, flexibility, empowerment, outsourcing, etc. Beyond the variety of
ways taken by firms and the variety of strategies they carry out these labels
signal a new trend towards more autonomy of workers as middle layers of
the hierarchy are suppressed (OECD, 1999). The organization of work is
becoming more decentralized, as has been documented in many empirical
studies: Osterman (1994) for US manufacturing, NUTEK (1996) for the
Swedish economy and Greenan (1996a,b) and Greenan and Guellec (1998)
for French manufacturing. As hierarchical layers disappear, rank and file
workers have to take decisions that used to be taken by their boss: dealing
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with customers, fixing technical hitches and deciding on inventories. Between
1988 and 1993 80% of French manufacturing firms with more than 50
employees have changed  the  organization  of their production process.
Thirty-one per cent of these reorganized firms have reduced their number of
hierarchical layers and 43% have introduced autonomous teamwork. After
reorganization blue collar workers have become responsible for controlling the
quality of products in 37% of firms and for proposing process improvements
in 40% of them (Greenan, 1996a). French labor force surveys tell a similar
story. In 1987 38% of skilled blue collar workers and 21% of unskilled ones
had to fix hitches by themselves. These shares reached 46% and 31%,
respectively, in 1993 (Aquain et al., 1994). In 1991 42% of skilled blue collar
workers had some direct contact with customers, as compared with 47% in
1993. A parallel evolution is the rise in the share of small and medium sized
firms in total employment, as documented by the decreasing weight of
Fortune 500 firms in the US labor force. This means that a growing number
of workers are directly faced with the market, having to act and react as
technology and market conditions change and, hence, having to be
autonomous. With more decentralized firms and more small businesses the
organizational picture of western economies is changing. This is to be con-
trasted with the previously dominant scheme, based on a Taylorist tradition,
which emphasized the advantage of setting precise norms and closely
monitoring workers through their specialization in conception or execution
activities (Braverman, 1974). Why has there been such a revolution in the
organization of firms?
The economic literature about organizational change has so far provided
four main explanations for this phenomenon. The first is based on technical
change. New technologies allow more efficient processing of information,
both in terms of speed and of cost. It is one key role of hierarchies that is
challenged by computers and communication technologies: networks in-
creasingly replace bosses with direct interactions between workers (Bolton
and Dewatripont, 1994). A second explanation underlines the role of market
instability. In a world characterized by a highly uncertain demand as well as
strong market volatility firms’ competitiveness depends heavily on their
ability to react rapidly and costlessly to unforeseen events. In this respect,
decentralized work organizations prove more efficient than hierarchical,
bureaucratic ones (Aoki, 1986). Third is a shortening in the length of batches,
which reduces the economies of scale arising from an organization based on a
strict division of labor. Shorter batches require a high adaptability of the
labor force, in order to ensure quick learning by doing (Greenan and Guellec,
1994). Finally, it has been argued (Aoki, 1990; Boyer, 1991) that the
Organizational Change and Skill Accumulation
482
strengthening of employees’ democratic aspirations is challenging hierarchical
relationships at the root of the centralized model.
The model presented here puts forward a fifth explanation, namely skill
accumulation, i.e. the increase in the skill or educational level of the
workforce. The influence of skills upon work organization has been widely
acknowledged in recent literature (Marsden and Ryan, 1991; Soskice, 1993).
The  skill level of the labor force is seen as impacting directly on the
organization of firms. Skill is about mastering complex issues. For workers to
be autonomous in a complex economy they must be skilled, otherwise they
are likely to make wrong decisions, based on a poor understanding of the
issues at stake. Unskilled workers will then perform jobs that are free of
complex decisions, while such decisions will be taken by skilled workers.
Kremer (1993) and Kremer and Maskin (1996) also focus on the
relationships between the level of education in the economy, the structure of
skills within firms and wage inequality. However, they do not explicitly model
organizational change. They show that if production takes place according to
an o-ring function there is some cross-matching of skills within firms as long
as skill dispersion remains below a certain threshold. Acemoglu (1999)
displays similar results, adding that the probability of separating equilibria
increases with the proportion of skilled workers in the economy. Thesmar
and Thoenig (2000) model a relationship between skills, technical change and
organizational change. A more highly skilled labor force leads to faster
technical change and hence to changes in work organization aimed at
reducing the cost of implementation of the new technology. Lindbeck and
Snower (1996) go deeper into what organization actually is. The organiza-
tional pattern they display is close to ours: Taylorist firms specialize workers
by occupation, whereas in holistic firms workers rotate among different tasks.
However, the authors focus on multi-tasking rather than autonomy and on
horizontal rather than vertical division of work. Moreover, they draw no link
between the nature of tasks and the skills of workers. As a result, wage in-
equality arises between workers attached to different types of firms, whatever
their skills. Moreover, as in Kremer and Maskin, changes in organization are
fostered by external shocks. Our model also generates a higher homogeneity
of the in-firm skill structure as well as a pattern for wage inequality, but
these result from endogenous organizational change. This is driven by a
long-lasting trend in western economies: the increase in the supply of skilled
workers.
An explanation of organizational change based on accumulation of skills does
not necessarily exclude some influence of other factors, notably those
mentioned above. More precisely, changes in the skill level of the labor force
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may contribute to these factors. Technology is closely related to organization,
so that in many cases these two aspects can hardly be disentangled, such as for
the assembly line. Information and communication technologies have been
shown to require more highly skilled workers and a new organization
altogether. In a world where the direction of technical change is endogenous,
i.e. where technical change enhances the productivity of skills (Acemoglu,
1998), the two explanations can be reconciled: the increasing availability of
skilled workers generates both a technology and an organization that demand
more skills. Also, skilled workers are probably more demanding in terms of
participation in decision making (‘democratic aspirations’) than are unskilled
ones. Demand for more differentiated goods, and hence smaller batches, comes
from higher income customers, i.e. generally those endowed with more skills.
We propose a simple model based on comparative advantages and relating
organizational change to skill accumulation. Our economy is composed of two
types of workers: ‘skilled workers’ who have been through the education
system up to the end of secondary school and ‘unskilled workers’ who have
not. We assume that secondary education strengthens primary education
attainments in reading, writing and calculation, while, at the same time,
developing abilities in synthesis, analysis and discussion. Our definition of
skills is thus restrictive, focused on formal knowledge transmitted through the
education system.
Final production requires two parallel activities on the part of workers:
knowledge and raw labor production. Knowledge is about the best way to
carry out tasks, to sequence them in time and to react to technical hitches or
signals coming from the demand side. It is not given to the firm but produced
on site, through conception activities that are time consuming. Once production
plans and tasks are designed some raw labor is required in order to perform
them. This is provided through execution activities, which consist of the imple-
mentation of the whole range of tasks designed through conception activities.
The organization of work is characterized by the way skilled and unskilled
labor combine together in order to produce knowledge and raw labor. Two
alternative modes of organization may be chosen by firms: a centralized mode
(the C model) and a decentralized one (the D model).1 The central feature of
the C model rests on a clear separation between conception and execution
activities. Skilled workers are specialized in knowledge production with
knowledge taking the form of norms, orders and assignments. These are
issued to unskilled workers who are specialized in execution activities. Such
an organization makes full use of the comparative advantage of skilled
1 This approach is in many ways similar to Greenan and Guellec (1994), although the production
functions are quite different.
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workers in conception activities. Firms can also opt for a decentralized
organization, the D model. In this case vertical division of labor is replaced
by autonomy and self-responsibility of workers: whatever their skills, workers
have to carry out execution tasks along with conception ones.
We opt here for embedding organization in the production function. The
characteristics of work organization are captured by the functional form itself,
rather than, as is usually the case, by a factor added to the production
function, the so-called ‘organizational capital’. Such a factor captures the
economic value of an organizational pattern, its contribution to productivity,
but gives no clue as to how the production factors are arranged so as to work
together. This is clearly insufficient to reflect the deep structural changes
which may occur at a microeconomic or plant level when the organization of
work is modified. When a firm changes its technology or organization this
often generates a discontinuity. This discontinuity is not only of a quantitative
nature. It is also a qualitative change, involving specific trade-offs: the gains
arising from the switch are usually partly outweighed by losses, even though
the  overall outcome  proves  positive. There is creative destruction, for
organization as well as for technology. Our approach allows us to account for
those qualitative, not only quantitative, changes in organizational modes.
Firms choose their organization so as to maximize profit. This results in an
organizational regime characterized by a distribution of firms over the two
modes of organization, C and D. One key outcome of the paper is that the
very nature of the organizational regime which eventually prevails depends
on the supply of skilled and unskilled labor. In turn, the organizational regime
affects the demand for each category of workers, hence their relative price.
We thus study the dynamics of wages and organizational change as skills
accumulate in the economy.
A first result is that as the supply of skilled workers increases the economy
goes through a path of organizational change. When unskilled labor is
abundant the organizational regime is mixed: decentralized and centralized
firms coexist in the economy. Skilled labor, which is scarce, is all employed in
centralized firms where it is specialized in knowledge production. In contrast,
unskilled workers participate in both centralized and decentralized
organizations. As the relative supply of skilled workers increases this gives rise
to a first phase of growing centralization with an increasing proportion of the
labor force being employed in centralized firms. In a second phase the
centralized organization dominates in the economy: all workers, whatever
their skills, are employed in centralized firms. In a third phase skilled labor
has become abundant enough for firms to start using it both in conception
and execution activities. This leads to the spreading of a decentralized mode
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of organization at the expense of the old centralized system, with the former
finally overtaking in the whole economy.
The pattern of organizational change displayed by our approach is broadly
consistent with historical evidence. Over the 19th century the so-called
Taylorist mode of organization, also referred to as ‘the American system of
manufacturing’ (although somewhat excessively since it also has European
roots), steadily developed in Western countries (Chandler, 1962), under-
mining craft production. It undoubtedly culminated in the middle of the 20th
century with the building up of large hierarchical firms characterized by a
strong division of labor. In contrast, over the past decades a move towards
decentralization has taken place, leading to a stop in the bureaucratization
process of Taylorist firms and to the development of highly skilled enterprises
through outsourcing and firm creation. The shift from decentralized craft
production to centralized industrial production had induced great changes in
the working routines of the unskilled. The separation between conception and
execution activities had led to some dequalification of their work and their
specialization in execution activities. This move was one of the forces that
drove industrialization since if organization had remained decentralized,
manufacturing would not have sucked up the largest share of the labor force,
still unskilled. In contrast, the shift experienced nowadays implies that skilled
workers have to modify the way they work as they progressively lose their
hierarchical position: decision making is shared between a greater number of
skilled workers who have to handle a wider range of tasks within flatter
organizations.
A second result is that as decentralization starts to spread in the economy,
wage inequality across skilled and unskilled workers stops decreasing. In a
centralized regime the productivity of skilled workers decreases as they
become more numerous, which brings about a steady reduction in the
skilled–unskilled wage gap. This is no longer the case as decentralization
develops, so that the reduction in wage inequality is stopped. This is in line
with empirical evidence from OECD countries where the downward trend in
skill-related wage inequalities experienced throughout the 1970s was
interrupted by the beginning of the 1980s (Aghion et al., 1999). A series of
works by Goldin and Katz (1999, for instance) shows that in the USA the
wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers decreased throughout the
20th century up to the early 1980s, before widening in the last two decades.
For other countries the available evidence for the after war period displays
similar features, although there was only a leveling off and no widening of the
wage gap in the 1980s, except in the UK (see Atkinson, 1997).
A third result concerns the nature of the skill mix within firms. In the first
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organizational phase the share of skilled workers in the total labor force of
centralized firms is constant and decentralized firms employ only unskilled
workers. When the centralized model dominates in the economy the share of
skilled workers starts to grow within C firms. In this second phase cross-
matching of skills within firms reaches its highest level. In the third stage the
proportion of skilled workers in centralized firms stabilizes at a level which is
higher than that observed in the first phase and decentralized firms start
employing a growing number of skilled workers, who are no longer associated
with the unskilled in the production process.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
works out the patterns of organizational change and wage inequality as the
relative supply of skilled workers increases in the economy. Section 4 tests the
two main predictions of the model using French establishment-level data.
Preliminary support is found for both of them. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
We consider an economy in which firms produce one homogeneous good,
consumed by workers. Product and labor markets are competitive. The
working population is of fixed size n. Each firm uses two primary inputs
(skilled and unskilled workers) and experiences constant returns to scale.
Production requires two parallel activities on the part of workers: conception
(knowledge production) and execution (direct or raw labor production). The
production process combines knowledge (m) and raw labor (l) in the following
manner (generic production function):
yt = Amtα lt1 – α (1)
where yt denotes output and A is a technical progress parameter (assumed to
be constant in the following).
We assume that skilled workers are more productive than unskilled ones
in both knowledge and raw labor production, but that their comparative
advantage is bigger at conception activities. Education particularly affects the
ability to analyze complex sets of data, as well as to draw conclusions from
various, and sometimes brand new, information. As a consequence, the
capacity of skilled workers to conceive and adapt plans of production as well
as task designs is higher than that of unskilled workers. Formally:
δs > δu (H1)
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where δs and δu denote the respective productivity of skilled and unskilled
workers in knowledge production. Because they can better analyze produc-
tion tasks, skilled workers are also more able in execution activities. Using the
words of Lindbeck and Snower (1996), the ‘informational complementarity’
between conception and execution tasks is stronger for skilled than for
unskilled workers:
γs > γu (H2)
where γs and γu are the respective productivity of skilled and unskilled workers
in execution activities. Nevertheless, the related productivity gap between
skilled and unskilled workers is assumed to be wider in conception than in
execution activities. This builds a relative advantage for skilled workers in
knowledge production:
(δs/δu) > (γs/γu) (H3)
We define the organization of work as an allocation of both types of workers
between conception and execution activities. Production can be organized in
two ways: one in which workers are specialized in a single activity and one in
which they are involved in both types of tasks. In the first model the
workforce is allocated to an activity according to its skills. Work is vertically
divided and the corresponding organizational model is said to be centralized.
In the second model work is vertically integrated and its organization is said
to be decentralized.
2.1 The Centralized (C) Model
In the C model the combination of knowledge and raw labor depicted by
equation (1) takes place at the level of the firm. Workers are either knowledge
processors or raw material processors. Knowledge workers take decisions con-
cerning task design and production plans and monitor their implementation.
They are both experts and bosses. Execution workers are in charge of direct
production: they provide raw labor and comply with orders issued by the
hierarchy.
Each type of worker is specialized in the activity in which her/his com-
parative advantage is bigger. So, skilled workers are allocated to conception
and unskilled workers to execution activities. Omitting subscript t, the
production function in the centralized model writes:
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yc = Amcα lc1 – α (2)
where yc denotes output, mc knowledge and lc raw labor. Knowledge and raw
labor are defined as follows:
mc = δsnsc (3)
lc = γunuc (4)
where nsc and nuc are, respectively, the number of skilled and unskilled workers
employed in the C model. The amount of knowledge that is produced
depends on the effectiveness of skilled workers in conception activities (δs),
while the amount of raw labor available for direct production depends on the
effectiveness of unskilled workers in execution activities (γu). Finally, the
production function writes:
yc = A(δsnsc)α(γunuc)1 – α (5)
2.2 The Decentralized (D) Model
In the D model workers are not specialized in a task. They participate both in
conception and execution activities so that the generic production function
depicted by equation (1) is embedded in each worker. Let yid denote the
production of an i-type worker (i = u;s) in the D model:
yid = A(mid)α(ldi)1 – α (6)
The amount of knowledge produced by a worker of type i (mid) depends
both on the fraction of time devoted to conception activities (µi;0 ≤ µi ≤ 1)
and on his effectiveness in knowledge production (δi). Formally:
mid = µi δi (7)
The remaining fraction of time (1 – µi) is dedicated to execution activities,
with productivity γi. Hence, the amount of raw labor entering final pro-
duction is given by:
lid = (1 – µi)γi (8)
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Aggregate production in the D model is just the sum of workers’ output:
yd = Σi ydi·ndi (9)
⇔ yd = A{(δsµs)α[γs(1 – µs]1 – αnsd + (δuµu)α[γu(1 – µu]1 – αnud} (10)
where nsd and nud denote the number of skilled and unskilled workers
employed in the decentralized model, respectively. The above specification
accounts for two main features of a decentralized work organization: the
autonomy of workers, as opposed to the hierarchical structure of the C model,
and the greater variety of tasks they perform. Whatever their skills, workers
decide on their own how to carry out direct production tasks. They do so
during the fraction of time allocated to conception activities. In the D model
knowledge is less formal than in the C model because it does not need to be
translated  into  norms, orders or assignments. Moreover, since work is
vertically integrated, each category of workers performs a wider range of
tasks.
Firms allocate workers’ time between conception and direct production so
as to maximize profit:
(11)
Solving this program yields µi = α ∀ i, which implies that time allocation
is identical for both skilled and unskilled workers, as it depends only on the
elasticity of production with respect to conception activities, α. Hence, the
production function in the D model can be rewritten as:
yd = Aαα(1 – α)1 – α[(δs)α(γs)1 – αnsd + (δu)α(γu)1 – αnud] (12)
3. Skill Accumulation and Organizational Change
We assume that the number of skilled workers available in the economy, ns, is
exogenous and growing at a constant pace:
nst – nst – 1 = ∆ns > 0 ∀ nst – 1 < n (H4)
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We proceed through a two step solution. First, we assess firms’ organiza-
tional choice for given levels of the skilled–unskilled relative wage. Then we
determine market wages under each organizational regime, assuming that
both skilled and unskilled labor markets are in equilibrium.
3.1 Relative Wages and Organizational Choices
A firm can choose to be either centralized or decentralized. It will do so in
order to minimize the average cost of production. Under centralization this is:
ACc = 1/A(ws/αδs)α[wu/(1 – α)γu]1 – α (13)
This mode of organization is denoted C(u,s) since the organization of work is
centralized and production requires both skilled and unskilled workers.
Under decentralization both types of workers are perfect substitutes in the
production process. The effective cost (wie) of each type of worker (i = u;s) is
given by the ratio of market wage to productive efficiency:
wie = wi/[Aαα(1 – α)1 – α(δi)α(γi)1 – α] (14)
A D firm will always choose the category of workers that proves cheaper
according to equation (14). Three types of decentralized organizations are
then possible: decentralization with only unskilled workers D(u), decentral-
ization with only skilled workers D(s) and  decentralization with both
categories being employed D(u,s). Although the D(u,s) configuration with a
mixed labor force is conceivable, we will see that it is never chosen because it
is always dominated by the C(u,s) configuration. The average costs of D(u)
and D(s) are, respectively:
ACD(u) = wu/[Aαα(1 – α)1 – α(δu)α(γu)1 – α] (15)
ACD(s) = ws/[Aαα(1 – α)1 – α(δs)α(γs)1 – α] (16)
In both D(u) and D(s) the labor force is more autonomous and more homo-
geneous than in C(u,s). However, D(u) and D(s) differ according to the skill
level of their workforce. D(u) can be seen as craft organization, resting on
unskilled workers who carry out the production process from its beginning to
its end. In D(u) the fact that workers are unskilled does not imply that they
embed no useful knowledge about the production process. As they participate
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into conception activities they incorporate practical knowledge acquired on
the job, through experience. In this case ‘unskilled’ may seem improper, but
it simply indicates that the workers’ knowledge does not come from formal
education. D(s) is a decentralized organization of a different type as all the
workers it employs are skilled, i.e. they have been through the education
system. This type of organization is to be found in many areas of the service
sector. Indeed, lawyers, consultants, accountants, researchers, software pro-
grammers, etc. often work in firms where the workforce is homogeneously
skilled.
In order to decide on their work organization, firms must compare
separately the average cost of production in each of the decentralized modes,
D(u), D(s) and D(u,s), with that under C(u,s). The outcome of this comparison
is summarized in Figure 1.
As far as technical efficiency is concerned D(u), C(u,s) and D(s) can be
ranked as follows: D(u) < C(u,s) < D(s). Skilled workers being more pro-
ductive in both knowledge and direct production, it is technically more
efficient to have them in both activities, D(s), than in one, C(u,s), which is
more efficient than employing unskilled workers in both tasks, D(u).
However, from an economic point of view the gain in terms of performance
brought about by skilled workers has to be balanced against the additional
wage cost they induce. If the additional cost (ws/wu) is lower than the gain in
both knowledge (δs/δu) and raw labor (γs/γu) activities the firm employs only
skilled workers and assigns them to both types of activities, D(s). If the
additional cost is lower than the gain in conception activities but higher than
that in direct production the firm will choose to be centralized with skilled
workers employed in knowledge production and, correspondingly, unskilled
workers employed in execution activities, C(u,s). When efficiency gains do
not compensate for the cost of employing skilled labor the firm chooses to
employ only unskilled workers and is then decentralized, D(u). Finally, when
FIGURE 1. Firm’s organizational choice.
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ws/wu = γs/γu (respectively δs/δu) firms are indifferent between D(s) and C(u,s)
[respectively D(u) and C(u,s)].
No firm ever chooses to be decentralized with both types of workers, D(u,s),
because this mode of organization is always more costly than a fully central-
ized one. A firm is ready to hire both skilled and unskilled workers in a
decentralized organization only if
ACD(u) = ACD(s) ⇔ ws/wu = (δs/δu)α(γs/γu)1 – α
However, if this happens to be the case C(u,s) is more profitable since the gain
in terms of effectiveness due to hiring a skilled worker is δs/δu in C(u,s) as
compared with (δs/δu)α(γs/γu)1 – α in D(u,s). Given that δs/δu > γs/γu, δs/δu >
ws/wu = (δs/δu)α(γs/γu)1 – α. So, whatever the value of ns, D(u,s) is always domin-
ated by C(u,s).
From this sequence of organizational choices one can derive the patterns of
organizational change as the relative supply of skilled workers increases in the
economy.
3.2 Patterns of Organizational Change
Setting skilled and unskilled labor markets to equilibrium yields:
nsc + nsd = ns (17)
nuc + nud = nu (18)
nu + ns = n (19)
where n denotes the whole working population. Under pure centralization the
relative wage is given by:
ws/wu = (α/1 – α)[(n/ns) – 1] (20)
Combining (20) with the threshold values of ws/wu given in Figure 1 yields
the pattern of organizational choices made by firms as ns varies (see Figure 2)
with:
ns1 = n/{1 + [(1 – α)/α] · δs/δu}
and
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ns2 = n/{1 + [(1 – α)/α] · γs/γu}
When all workers are unskilled (ns = 0) the firm obviously chooses to be
decentralized and the prevailing organizational regime is D(u).
When some workers become skilled a centralized model with strict vertical
division of labor C(u,s) becomes possible. We show that when the number of
skilled workers in the economy is lower than ns1 equilibrium on the labor
market maintains the relative wage ws/wu at a constant level δs/δu, so that any
firm is indifferent between D(u) and C(u,s).2 The aggregate employment
structure is then:
nsc = ns (21)
nuc = [(1 – α)/α] (δs/δu) ns (22)
(23)
In this range of values of ns skilled workers are so scarce that their wage would
be extremely high if all workers were employed in the centralized sector (ws/wu
> δs/δu). The gain in effectiveness they bring about in conception activities
(δs/δu) would not cover the additional cost they would then induce (ws/wu). A
wholly decentralized structure with only unskilled workers, D(u), is also
inefficient since skilled workers would remain unemployed. The efficient
organizational structure is then mixed. Two sectors coexist in the economy: a
centralized sector which hires all skilled workers along with some unskilled
(according to a ratio determined by profit maximization) and a decentralized
n n nud s
s
u= − +
−F
HG
I
KJ
1
1 α
α
δ
δ
FIGURE 2. Pattern of organizational change.
2 The proof is as follows. If ws/wu > δs/δu, according to Figure 1 the firm would choose D(u). Then ws
= 0, so that ws < wu, which contradicts the above assumption that ws/wu > δs/δu >1. Accordingly, if ws/wu
< δs/δu the firm chooses C(u,s). But in this case, for values of ns < ns1, ws/wu > δs/δu, which contradicts
the above assumption. Hence, ws/wu = δs/δu ∀ ns < ns1. QED.
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one which hires all remaining unskilled workers. The corresponding
organizational regime is labeled D(u)-C(u,s). As ns increases towards ns1 the
proportion of the workforce employed in the centralized sector increases at the
expense of the decentralized one: the centralized mode of organization spreads
over in the economy. It is this progressive shift towards the C(u,s) model that
induces constancy of the relative wage in the D(u)-C(u,s) regime. In the D(u)
model the marginal productivity of unskilled workers is constant, but in the
centralized one the vertical interdependency between skilled and unskilled
workers generates a complementarity. As the share of skilled workers increases
so does the marginal productivity of unskilled workers employed in the C
model. So, an increasing fraction of them is hired in centralized firms up to the
optimal ratio nsc/nuc = αδu/(1 – α)δs, thus allowing the relative wage to be
constant: ws/wu = δs/δu.
When ns1 < ns < ns2 skilled workers are numerous enough for the whole
labor force to be profitably employed in centralized firms. The aggregate
employment structure simply writes as:
nsc = ns (24)
nuc = n – ns (25)
The relative wage varies according to equation (20). It has gone down (γs/γu
< ws/wu < δs/δu) so that the additional cost induced by skilled workers is now
lower than the gain in effectiveness they bring in conception activities (δs/δu),
though still higher than the gain they would bring to direct production (γs/γu).
It is thus optimal for firms to choose a centralized organization, with skilled
workers specialized in knowledge production and unskilled workers special-
ized in execution. The corresponding organizational regime is denoted C(u,s).
When the number of skilled workers in the economy becomes greater than
ns2 another mixed regime prevails, where D(s) plays a part comparable to that
played by D(u) in the D(u)-C(u,s) regime: the skilled workforce is now
abundant whereas unskilled workers are scarce. The equilibrium on the labor
market leads to a constant relative wage, ws/wu = γs/γu, for which firms are
indifferent between C(u,s) and D(s). The aggregate employment structure is
given by:
nsc = [α/(1 – α)](γu/γs)(n – ns) (26)
nuc = n – ns (27)
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nsd = ns – {[α/(1 – α)](γu/γs)(n – ns)} (28)
The relative wage of the skilled is now low enough to make it worth having
them both in knowledge and direct production. A D(s) sector coexists with
a centralized one, C(u,s), in which all unskilled workers are employed. The
corresponding organizational regime is thus denoted C(u,s)-D(s). As ns
increases from ns2 to n the centralized sector shrinks and the decentralized
sector expands: an increasing fraction of the labor force is employed in the
latter.
Finally, when the entire workforce is skilled (ns = n) all firms shift towards
decentralization. The D(s) regime then prevails.
In summary, according to our theoretical framework, as the supply of
skilled workers increases the economy travels through the following path of
organizational change:
D(u) → D(u)-C(u,s) → C(u,s) → C(u,s)-D(s) → D(s)
If we assume that centralized firms mainly produce manufactured goods
and that decentralized firms are involved either in agriculture and craft
activities or in advanced services our model accounts for long-term changes
in work organization. When the general level of education was very low all
over what is now the industrialized world, most economies were dominated
by small businesses, mainly agricultural and craft, organized on a largely
autonomous basis. This corresponds to our D(u) regime. As the level of
education went up in the 19th century vertical division of labor started to
develop and gave birth to modern manufacturing, while the rural exodus and
industrialization accelerated. Our D(u)-C(u,s) regime provides a stylized
account of this transition towards a scientific organization of work, as
promoted by engineers like Fayol and Taylor. Thus we propose for this period
an alternative interpretation to that given by Chandler (1990), who explains
organizational change by the development of the railway system and financial
markets and by the creation of standards in accountancy. However, he refers
to education in many places in his book. When he analyzes British capitalism
(Part III, pp. 291–294) Chandler highlights the under-investment in
education as compared with Germany or the USA.3 This would have slowed
down the centralization movement within British firms. Concerning US
3 When he considers the education system Chandler is mainly interested in engineering and business
schools. His implicit definition of skills is thus more restrictive than ours as it is focused on higher
education. However, secondary school is generally needed to enter university. Moreover, there also exists a
vertical division of labor in conception activities (not formalized here) where workers with higher
educational attainments are the bosses of other, less educated skilled workers.
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capitalism, Chandler describes a situation in which firms’ integration and the
related rationalization of production and distribution channels created a
strong demand for higher education, contributing to the development of
universities and schools. As economic development went on and the education
level increased in all countries a wholly centralized organization started to
dominate. This dates back to the first half of the 20th century and is often
referred to as the ‘Fordist’ regime (Boyer, 1991). It was characterized by a
sharp division between conception and execution activities, leading to task
specialization on a large scale. This new step towards centralization is
accounted for in our model by the C(u,s) regime, in which all firms finally opt
for a centralized organization. Eventually, a new trend in work practices has
emerged over the past 20 years which has been characterized by a move
towards more decentralization of responsibility in favor of skilled workers.
This is particularly the case in advanced information and communication
services, where workers are often independent consultants. This is accounted
for in our framework by the C(u,s)-D(s) regime, in which a rising proportion
of the skilled labor force is employed in decentralized firms.
3.3 Wage Inequality
As the decentralized mode of organization tends to spread in the economy
wage inequality stops decreasing. In the wholly centralized regime the relative
wage of skilled workers decreases as they become more numerous, which
brings about a steady reduction in inequality. This is no longer the case in the
C(u,s)-D(s) regime since the proportion of skilled to unskilled workers is now
kept constant in centralized firms. As a consequence, the skilled–unskilled
wage gap stabilizes and wage inequality stops decreasing (see Figure 3).
This result is consistent with trends in educational wage differentials ex-
perienced by most industrialized countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Between
1970 and 1980 the university/high school differential decreased in Canada,
Sweden, Japan, France, the USA and UK (Machin, 1996). These decreases
ranged from 5 to 15% according to country and stopped by 1980. Between
1980 and the early 1990s the educational wage gap remained roughly
constant in Canada, Germany, Finland, France and Italy. It increased slightly
in the Netherlands and Japan, and rose sharply in the USA and UK (see
Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). So, all the major industrialized economies
had experienced at least a stop in the downward trend of educational wage
inequality by the beginning of the 1980s (OECD, 1996).
Our model is consistent with this general stylized fact since wage inequality
stops decreasing as the decentralized mode of organization starts spreading in
Organizational Change and Skill Accumulation
497
the economy. It does not account for the sharp rise in wage inequality
experienced by a small number of countries, such as the USA and UK. This
comes as no surprise since in these two countries the increasing wage
dispersion seems to have been partly caused by a very different factor from
the one modelled here, i.e. the weakening of labor market institutions
(Gosling and Machin, 1995; Fortin and Lemieux, 1997). In this respect our
model seems to fit better with evidence from continental Europe rather than
from Anglo-Saxon economies.
In addition to this account of long-term changes in organization and wages
the model provides some testable predictions.
4. Empirical Implications of the Model
The model developed above provides two testable predictions. In this section
we compare them to some existing empirical evidence and propose some
direct tests using French establishment-level data.4
4.1 Skill Supply and Organizational Change
When considering the organizational path displayed in Figure 2 from a
cross-sectional perspective and for developed countries, in which D(u) has
essentially disappeared, the model predicts that the more skilled workers are
FIGURE 3. Pattern of relative wages
4 These tests draw heavily on joint work with John Van Reenen (see Caroli and Van Reenen, 1999):
‘Skill Biased Organizational Change?’, CEPREMAP Working Paper 9917. We are most grateful to him for
letting us use them here.
Organizational Change and Skill Accumulation
498
available in an economy (the higher the educational level) the higher the
proportion of the labor force employed in decentralized firms. This prediction
should be tested on a cross-section  of  countries. However, if  data on
educational outcomes are available for a large number of OECD countries
data on innovative work practices and organizational change only exist for a
small number of countries and cross-country comparisons are still fragile
(OECD, 1999). Thus we propose to test our prediction on a cross-section of
French region–industry cells. We assume that because of the limited geo-
graphical and industrial mobility of most of the workforce the characteristics
in terms of education in the firms’ local environment has an influence on their
organizational behaviour. More precisely, the greater the fraction of skilled
workers available in their environment the more likely are firms to introduce
new work practices.
In order to test this prediction a reasonable strategy is to consider the im-
pact of the supply of skills in a firm’s local environment upon the probability
that the latter implement organizational changes (OC). This can be done
using a French survey called REPONSE, which provides information on
establishments’ strategies of organizational change: 2500 establishments were
surveyed in 1992 and senior managers were asked whether a series of new
work practices had been introduced in their workplace over the period
1989–1992. In the following we consider one particular practice, delayering,
which is closest to our theoretical notion of decentralization, and we code
establishments as having OC = 1 when delayering has already been im-
plemented or is in the process of being so (otherwise OC = 0). REPONSE also
provides information about establishments’ characteristics that may be used
as controls in the regression. The annual French labor force survey provides
information about educational attainments of the economically active
population that can be aggregated at the industry × region level (14 × 21
cells) and matched with the REPONSE survey. We define the supply of skilled
workers in the environment of a given establishment as the share of those
workers with a college or high school degree (baccalauréat) in the region and
industry where the establishment is located.
The propensity to introduce OC is an unobserved latent variable yijk so that
the empirical model takes the form of a simple probit:
yijk = αHEjk + βxijk + γ1Dj + γ2Dk + uijk (E1)
where
OCi = 1 if yijk > 0; OCi = 0 otherwise
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and i represents the establishment, j the region and k the industry. HE denotes
the proportion of workers with a college or high school degree in region j and
industry k where the establishment is located, xijk is a vector of the
establishment’s characteristics which are likely to affect a firm’s choice of
organizational change and Dj and Dk are regional and industry dummies.
Table 1 reports the results of the estimation of equation (E1).
Column 1 displays the raw correlation between local skill supply and the
probability that firms introduce organizational change. The coefficient is
correctly signed, although not significant at conventional levels. Column 2
controls for industry and regional dummies and the coefficient of the skill
variable becomes significant at the 10% level. Eventually, when estimating
the more complete model including a full set of establishment characteristics
(column 3) the partial impact of skills upon organizational change rises
sharply and becomes significant at the 5% level. These results support the
prediction that the more skilled workers are available in a firm’s local environ-
ment the higher the probability that these firms will introduce organizational
changes leading to more responsibility being awarded to workers.
4.2 Organizational Change and Firms’ Internal Skill Structures
A second prediction of our model is that as decentralization spreads in the
economy a growing fraction of the workforce becomes attached to firms that
only employ educated workers, D(s). Our theoretical framework does not tell
us much about the dynamics of skills at the individual firm level during the
transition from a centralized to a decentralized model. In fact, this transition
TABLE 1  Supply of Highly Educated Workers and Organizational Change (Delayering) in
France (1989–1992)
Organizational change 1989–1992
(1) (2) (3)
High education (%) 0.031 (0.084) 0.563 (0.291) 0.921 (0.426)
Extended controls No No Yes
Industry dummies (14) No Yes Yes
Regional dummies (21) No Yes Yes
Observations 2112 2112 1014
Log likelihood –1461.5 –1356.8 –614.5
Pseudo R² 0.000 0.072 0.121
These are  the marginal  effects  (and associated  standard errors) from  a probit  maximum likelihood
estimation. Extended controls include establishment size, whether the establishment is public or private,
whether a union is recognized, how much of the labor force is unionized and whether demand has risen or
fallen over the last 3 years.
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may take two different forms: (i) the creation of new firms organized
according to the D(s) model while some C(u,s) firms are destroyed;5 (ii) a
progressive transformation of C(u,s) firms into D(s) ones leading to a sharp
drop in the ratio of unskilled to skilled workers. It is rather difficult to
measure transition through creation and destruction of firms because newly
created as well as newly destroyed firms are harder to survey than older ones.
However, available data allows a check as to whether the skill structure of
surviving firms becomes more homogeneous when they adopt innovative
work practices.
Some empirical studies have already tested such a prediction. The OECD
(1999) has investigated the relations between the use of a set of innovative
work practices and the required skills of the workforce using the declarations
of a sample of establishments from 10 European countries in 1996 (EPOC
survey). It appears that establishments with flatter hierarchical structures and
those that use teamwork are less likely to have low skill requirements for their
workforce. Using US data, both Black and Lynch (1997) and Bresnahan et al.
(2001) find that implementation of innovative work practices is more
efficient, as measured through their impact on productivity, when the skill
level of the workforce is higher. Using data on British establishments in the
late 1980s (The Workplace and Industrial Relations Survey, WIRS), Caroli
and Van Reenen (1998) show that the proportion of unskilled manual workers
in 1990 is significantly lower in those establishments which have delayered
over the period 1981–1984.
For French manufacturing three empirical studies have tested the relation
between skills and organizational practices. Using a 1987 labor force survey
on work organization (‘Enquête Techniques et Organisation du Travail’,
TOTTO), Greenan and Guellec (1998) show that the autonomy of front line
workers, as well as the intensity of communication, are both negatively
correlated with the share of unskilled manual workers in the firm. The SESSI
survey on organizational change (‘Enquête Changement Organisationnel’),
conducted in 1993, asks firms about the adoption of new organizational
practices during the period 1988–1993. Firms that have adopted innovative
work practices (autonomous work teams, quality circles or problem solving
groups, delayering and/or increased responsibilities for front line workers)
more frequently declare that the required skills of their managers, supervisors
and blue collar workers have increased (Greenan, 1996a). Matching this
survey with a survey on firms’ occupational structures (‘Enquête Structure des
5 This may happen through the development of start-ups of a D(s) type which challenge old C(u,s) firms
in their market, but also through the splitting up of C(u,s) firms into C(u,s) and D(s) firms. Downsizing
and outsourcing of non-core functions may go along with the latter type of transition.
Organizational Change and Skill Accumulation
501
Emplois’, ESE), Greenan (1996b) shows that firms that have adopted a cluster
of innovative work practices have increased their share of executives at the
expense of that of clerks. Hence, workplace innovation is conducive to trans-
formed white collar work favoring skills. Eventually, using the REPONSE
data set and matching it with the ESE, Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) find
that the adoption of innovative work practices subsequently reduces the wage
bill share of unskilled manual workers. Over the period 1992–1996 this
decreased by 2.3 percentage points, with the introduction of delayering
accounting for some 38% of the fall. This suggests that the introduction of
innovative work practices has an important economic (and not only statistical)
impact on the reshaping of the occupational earnings structure at the expense
of the least skilled workers.
The REPONSE survey can also be used to directly test the relation between
skills and organizational change, as senior managers were asked whether there
have been increases or decreases in net employment of three groups of workers
(managers, intermediate workers and operatives) between 1989 and 1992.
This variable being qualitative, we estimate the following probit model:
∆nsijk = δ1OCijk + δ2xijk + δ3Dj + δ4Dk + εijk (E2)
where
∆nsijk = 1 if net employment has increased in
establishment i for skill group s
∆nsijk = 0 otherwise
and xijk, Dj and Dk are defined as in equation (E1). In this specification the
skill structure of the workforce is captured through the establishment’s
occupational structure. A prediction of our theory is that organizational
change should raise the proportion of workers employed in more highly
skilled occupations. Given the qualitative nature of our data, this would result
in OC having a greater positive impact (or smaller negative impact) on
employment increases for managers than for operatives. Table 2 presents the
regression results.
Organizational change generally appears to be accompanied by down-
sizing. Its impact upon net employment increases is negative for all categories
of workers (although not always quite significant). In the basic specification
OC has a negative effect upon net employment of both intermediate workers
and  operatives  at  conventional significance levels. The same holds for
Organizational Change and Skill Accumulation
502
operatives only in the most general specification. Moreover, in both estimates
the (negative) impact of OC is greater for lower qualification groups. In the
most general specification the point estimate is –0.062 for operatives whereas
it is only –0.027 for managers. So, although OC seems to have a negative
impact on net employment increases for all categories, it is more detrimental
to the lowest skill groups. This result is supportive of the second core
prediction from our model, i.e. the fact that following organizational change
skill homogeneity increases at the expense of the least skilled.
Overall, our theoretical model appears to be consistent with preliminary
empirical evidence based on French data. A second line of microeconomic tests
would investigate the impact of organizational changes on wages paid by
establishments or firms. Some work has been done in the US (see Cappelli,
1996) which shows that the introduction of new work practices does not have
a clear impact upon wage inequality across skill groups. So far we have not
had access to similar data for France but this line of research is definitely
challenging and, more generally, the impact of new work practices on pay
systems has to be investigated further.
5. Conclusions
The model presented here exhibits a sequence of organizational equilibria
generated by an increase in the share of skilled workers in the labor force. In
parallel a time pattern is generated for skilled and unskilled wages. The model
yields three main results.
First, as the proportion of skilled workers increases exogenously in the
population the economy travels through three main organizational equilibria:
when skilled labor is scarce the organization of firms is rather decentralized;
TABLE 2  Probability of Increase in Net Employment and Organizational Change in France
(1989–1992)
Managers Intermediate
workers
Operatives
Delayering (basic) –0.009 (0.018) –0.044 (0.017) –0.078 (0.017)
Observations 2112 2112 2112
R² 0.0001 0.004 0.011
Delayering (extended) –0.027 (0.032) –0.039 (0.027) –0.062 (0.028)
Observations 1007 1007 1007
R² 0.123 0.165 0.180
The basic regression does not include any controls. The extended regression includes the same establish-
ment controls as in Table 1 (including regional and industry dummies) plus a dummy for whether or not
the establishment uses computerized equipment. Standard errors in parentheses.
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as the stock of skills increases the economy progressively shifts to a more
centralized regime, before switching back to decentralization when skilled
labor is abundant. Such a pattern is consistent with historical evidence. In
particular, the past two decades have seen the emergence and diffusion of new
modes of organization characterized by a greater autonomy of workers. The
increasing share of independent workers and small firms in the labor force is
consistent with this trend. Although many studies have stressed the role of
technical change (the changing size of increasing returns to scale) as well as
institutional factors (competition policies) in this evolution, our model shows
that the accumulation of skills stands as another candidate. Second, as a
decentralized mode of organization starts to spread in the economy wage
inequality stops decreasing. Third, as the economy switches from a centralized
to a decentralized regime firms’ skill structures become more homogeneous.
Our model suggests some directions for further research. At the empirical
level we have provided some limited microeconometric evidence, but the
question of long-term macroeconomic trends is raised. In this respect,
systematic cross-country comparisons of work practices are called for. Such an
approach should hopefully allow the display of ‘national systems of
organization’ in the manner of the national innovation systems characterized
by Nelson (1993). This would provide a first step towards assessing the
relationships between national educational institutions, organizational
configurations and macroeconomic performance.
At a theoretical level, one interesting research avenue would aim at
enlarging our definition of organization, so as to take into account the com-
munication dimension. We have defined the centralized and decentralized
modes of organization with respect to the degree of autonomy awarded to
workers, as well as the range of tasks they perform. This view of organization
is somewhat restrictive and does not allow for any difference in the production
process at work in D(u) and D(s). Workers are perfectly autonomous in both
configurations and, in fact, there is little collective work: a firm with n
workers is identical to n firms with 1 worker. If this representation may
schematically describe the D(u) firm,6 the D(s) firm is likely to be more
complex. As a matter of fact, education increases the ability to formalize and
codify knowledge. Skilled workers are not only more efficient in conception
activities, they are also more likely to benefit from the knowledge of others
through communication. In this sense skills are certainly a more powerful tool
than computers in reducing communication costs. When employing a high
6 Of course, if we want a better match with reality the trade guilds typical of the craft industry imply
knowledge transfers between the master and the apprentice and forms of subordination that do not
correspond to the perfect autonomy that we formalize.
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proportion of skilled workers a decentralized firm is more able to insert into
communication networks and to benefit from the externalities involved in
horizontal information exchanges. So, a general theory of organizational
change should aim at combining the  approach in terms  of autonomy
developed here and an approach based on communication. This avenue is still
to be investigated.
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